Whilelastdecadehaswitnessedarapidgrowthofdigitaleconomy,thereislimitedunderstandinginliteratureonwhethertheconventionalwisdomonpricingstrategystillholdsforinformationgoods.Ononehand,informationgoods,similartodurablegoods,aresubjecttovaluedepreciation;ontheother,theydifferfromtraditionalgoodsinnegligiblemarginalcostandthesensitivitytosocialinfluences.Thispaperdevelopsatwo-period,game-theoreticmodeltoinvestigateoptimalpricingstrategyofinformationgoods.Ononedimension,twodifferentdepreciationmechanisms(self-andtime-depreciation)areconsidered;ontheother,twoprevalentpricingschemes(perpetuallicensingandsubscription-feemodels)arestudied.Weobtainclosed-formsolutionsinallscenarios.Ourfindingssuggestthatvendorsoftime-depreciationinformationgoodsshouldadoptsubscription-feemodeltoattractearlyadoptersandexploitsocialinfluences,whilethevendorsofself-depreciationinformationgoodsshouldstrategicallybalancebetweendepreciationandsocialinfluences.Interestingly,associalinfluencesbecomestrongenough,thedifferencebetweenpricingschemesdiminishesandthetradeoffbetweencandidatestrategiesvanishes.Wealsoextendthemodeltostaticpricinginwhichthevendorcommitstofutureprice.Wediscoverthatthesuperiorityofsubscription-feemodelmightbeoverturnedunderstaticpricing.Ourresultsabovealsoimplythatbuildingconsumerfeedbackandinteractionsystemscouldbehelpfulforminimizingthepotentiallossofasuboptimalpricingscheme.
